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Lackawanna & Johnstown: 
Shutdowns, Steel Towns 
and the Union 
by Jack Metzgar 
On a family vacation to Niagara Falls 
in the 1950s, my father insisted on a 
side-trip to the Lackawanna Plant of the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. He was a 
steelworker in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania, which also had a major 
Bethlehem steel mill. 
We drove around the Buffalo-area mill 
for what seemed like hours. Then we 
stopped across the street from one of its 
gates and walked along its perimeter. 
He pointed out various parts to me, but 
I don't remember much of what it look-
ed like. I do remember not being able to 
comprehend why we were spending so 
much time looking at a steel mill that 
looked exactly like the one back home. 
And I remember that he kept saying, 
"This is Bethlehem's jewel." As a 
10-year old, I couldn't imagine why my 
father was calling what we were looking 
at a "jewel." Long black and drab-
green buildings with red dust all over 
them, huge orangish furnaces topped 
by a spectacular blue flame, and lots of 
smoke. 
That was in 1953. Steelworkers were 
not paid that well then. The old steel 
towns, like Lackawanna and 
Johnstown, still looked like "hell with 
the lid off"—drab frame houses, built 
by the company 50 and 60 years earlier, 
squatted in oddly neat rows amidst the 
dust that the smoke left behind each 
day. But Lackawanna was the largest of 
Bethlehem's mills then, with nearly 
25,000 people working; Johnstown, 
with only about 16,000 workers, was 
small by comparison. 
On December 27, 1982, Bethlehem 
announced that it was all over for 
Lackawanna. Ironically, this was 
greeted with a sigh of relief in 
Johnstown. 
Ever since 1965 when Bethlehem built 
a multi-billion dollar greenfield plant at 
Burns Harbor, Indiana, people in 
Johnstown had thought their days were 
numbered. Many of them held 
Lackawanna in such awe that they 
couldn't imagine that the nation's 
second largest steel producer would 
abandon it, especially because for a 
decade Bethlehem has been threatening 
to leave Johnstown instead. 
Lackawanna Mayor Ed Kuwik called 
Bethlehem's decision "a disaster for the 
city," but Johnstown Mayor Herb Pfuhl 
acted as if he'd been given a Christmas 
present. The Johnstown newspaper 
bannered the announcement 
"Bethlehem keeps steel in Johnstown's 
future." And a United Steelworkers 
official in Johnstown proclaimed: "It's a 
sad day for Lackawanna, but it's a 
happy day for Johnstown." 
It was a hollow victory for Johnstown, 
however. Since 1977 Johnstown and 
Lackawanna have been competing with 
each other to see who's going to be left 
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with cold furnaces. Both are losing. In 
1977 Bethlehem shut down parts of both 
facilities, eliminating 5,000 jobs in 
Johnstown and 3,500 in Lackawanna. 
On December 27 it wiped out 7,300 
more in Lackawanna, but it also 
permanently eliminated another 2,300 
in Johnstown. 
Thirty years after my father looked 
over Bethlehem's "jewel," only 5,800 of 
41,000 jobs remain at the two 
mills—1,300 at a few remaining facilities 
at Lackawanna and 4,500 at Johnstown. 
And, as Bethlehem's announcement 
made very clear, another 2,300 jobs may 
be eliminated in Johnstown unless 
Steelworkers there grant extensive local 
concessions. 
The loss of more than 35,000 jobs over 
30 years is insignificant when viewed 
from the perspective of the national 
economy, which added some 40 million 
jobs during the same period. Even the 
loss of 10,000 in one fell swoop is just 
one day's headlines in an economy 
where more than 11 million people are 
unemployed. 
But the local effects of these job losses 
are well understood. The Lackawanna 
area economy will lose $200 million in 
payrolls and $6 million in taxes, for 
example. And social scientists can 
predict, "within an insignificant margin 
for e r r o r , " the increases in 
hypertension, ulcers, depression, child 
abuse and suicides that will follow. 
Bad as the local devastation will be, 
the suffering in Johnstown and 
Lackawanna is only a part of larger, and 
more ominous, picture. The social 
contract between capital and labor that 
has accounted for most of the dramatic 
increase in American living standards 
since 1953 is being "renegotiated." And 
most of the bargaining chips appear to 
be on capital's side of the table. 
The American steel industry is dying, 
and steelworkers and steel communities 
are not only suffering the 
consequences, they are being blamed 
for it. Worse, workers and communities 
have responded by battling each other 
instead of joining together to fight the 
corporations. 
Looking back to 1953 may help 
suggest just how ominous things are 
now. 
In many ways life was more grim in 
steel towns in 1953 fhan it is now, but 
the future was brighter. Layoffs after 
the peak production of the war years 
caused high unemployment, and few 
mills were hiring new workers because 
modernization allowed for substantial 
productivity improvements. Steel 
towns were incredibly dirty places with 
inferior schools, worn out housing and 
depleted public facilities. Steelworkers 
had increased their wages substantially 
during the wars, but owning a decent 
house was just beginning to be a pos-
sibility; vacations like the one we took 
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to Niagara Falls were still a novelty. 
And, contrary to the myth that labor 
peace was achieved in the decade after 
the National Labor Relations Act, labor 
relations in steel in the 1950s were 
pretty rough. Besides the daily battles 
with the bosses, the United 
Steelworkers had to strike four times 
during the decade to advance their 
wages and benefits. Even though the 
industry boomed in the mid-fifties and 
the companies recorded historic profit 
rates, the tension between labor and 
management grew. Finally, in 1959 the 
two sides squared off against each other 
in a match which was to determine their 
relative strengths for the following two 
decades: the Steelworkers won one of 
the longest strikes (116 days) in 
American history. 
As steelworkers' wages improved so 
did everything else. Though total 
employment continued to decline and 
most steel towns lost population over 
the years, through local taxes and 
steelworkers' wages steel towns were 
able to expropriate some of the 
companies' profits. As a result 
everybody's conditions of life improved 
steadily and, over the long run, 
dramatically. Owning a home and 
taking vacations came to be taken for 
granted. Small and large contractors, 
auto dealers and other local businesses 
prospered. And, despite fierce 
resistance from the companies, most of 
the worst pollution—the dust in the air 
and the raw industrial waste in the 
water—got cleaned up. 
Even more important for former 
company towns, like Lackawanna and 
Johnstown, was how the union had 
*~SyJi* £@SfMB 
SiflfVi 
humbled the giant corporation. In 1953 
one still heard of "old-timers" who 
lived the life of fear and humiliation that 
ruled before the union won its first 
contract in 1941. Many older 
steelworkers were still too intimidated 
to file a grievance because they didn't 
really believe that the boss could no 
longer fire them just for griping. 
In Johns town the Uni ted 
Steelworkers organized everybody in 
sight—from small machine shops to 
dairy workers. The local press, 
politicians and business leaders 
gradually learned a cautious respect for 
blue-collar workers, whether they were 
in a union or not. The USWA not only 
established the standard for wages and 
benefits in the area, it set the social 
" tone" for class status as well. 
Steelworkers learned that merchants, 
doctors and school teachers respected a 
man with a couple bucks in his pocket. 
Steelworkers' wages and benefits and 
steelworkers' power were at the root of 
everybody's improved condition of life 
and prospects for the future. 
Now, however, with 150,000 of them 
laid off, with unemployment benefits 
running out and families losing their 
homes, a tremendous campaign to 
humble them has been mounted. They 
and their union are said to be 
responsible for the industry's crisis. If 
they'd just grant "concessions" to the 
companies, somehow their jobs would 
be restored. Public sympathy goes out 
to the companies, and steelworkers are 
said to be cutting their own throats. 
Lackawanna is said to deserve its fate 
because it taxed Bethlehem too heavily. 
The root causes of the American steel 
industry's decline are complex, but it is 
not quite the dinosaur most people 
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think it is. It is the largest and the 
second most productive steel industry 
in the world; over the past ten years it 
has been the most profitable, two and 
three times more profitable than 
Germany and Japan. In 1981 it posted 
record profits, and its second highest 
rate of profit since 1956. Lackawanna 
had a nearly state-of-the-art Basic 
Oxygen Furnace, and Johnstown has 
the world's largest, most modern 
electric melt shop. 
This is not to say that the industry 
does not have serious long-term 
problems trying to compete in a 
national economy where extremely high 
rates of return are required. But its long-
term problems have little to do with 
why 150,000 steelworkers are laid off. 
The layoffs, and the new wave of shut-
downs, are a direct result of 
Reaganomics' thoughtless mixture of 
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supply-side fiscal policy and monetarist 
monetary policy and of the Reagan 
administration's redistribution of 
national income from consumers to 
investors. 
The immediate crisis in steel is but a 
reflection of the Reagan recession. 
There is very little demand for steel, and 
no amount of wage cuts and "Conces-
sions" will change that unless the 
economy enters a robust recovery. 
But assume that the current drift of 
public opinion about steelworkers has 
some logic to it: Steelworkers have gone 
too far, they've made it impossible for 
steel companies to make a decent profit. 
What does "going too far" mean? 
A steelworker who is covered by the 
Basic Steel contract is the highest paid 
industrial worker in the world. On 
average, when he works a full year, he 
earns about $25,000. Is that too much? 
It's about $6,000 above the median 
income, but then a steelworker doesn't 
work in an air-conditioned office: he or 
she works shifts—7 am to 3 pm one 
week, 3 to 11 the next and 11 to 7 the 
next. 
How well will an income of $25,000 
support a family of four? If the family is 
frugal and that yearly average income 
actually comes in every year (which it 
often does not), they'll be able to buy a 
house and take in one expensive vaca-
tion a year. Is that too much for an 
industrial worker? 
Still, steelworkers are not living in 
poverty. Surely they could give up a 
little to help their companies' cash flow 
during the hard times? 
That seems reasonable, but the 
problem is they have not been asked to 
"give up a little." Last summer USWA 
President Lloyd McBride offered the 
steel companies $2 billion in contract 
concessions and the companies, led by 
U.S. Steel and Bethlehem, turned him 
down. In November, McBride and the 
companies agreed on a much more 
radical concessions package, but USWA 
local union presidents rejected it. 
Chuck Molnar, chair of the Bethlehem 
locals' coordinating committee and 
president of Local 2635 in Johnstown, 
voted against that package. He 
estimates that it would have cost the 
average steelworker $7,000 in the first 
year. 
So, it looks like what an industrial 
worker is "supposed" to earn in the 
United States is about $18,000 a year. As 
a family income, that would not be 
enough to buy a home or take a vacation 
or to think about sending your children 
to college. In Johnstown this wage cut 
would have removed $50 million a year 
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from an already depressed local 
economy. And, steelworkers have 
always been pace-setters for blue-collar 
wages. Whatever they make, other 
industrial workers will get less, many 
much less. 
Many people in Johnstown, including 
many steelworkers, were upset with 
Chuck Molnar when he voted against 
this prospect. Since mid-summer the 
local newspaper, television news and 
radio talk shows have provided steady 
pressure for "concessions." One hears 
nasty comments about "bull-headed 
steelworkers" and "union bosses" 
wherever one goes, even in classic 
working-class settings like bars and 
family gatherings. Many steelworkers 
are confused and disheartened. One, 
after proclaiming against concessions 
for a half-hour, said he would give up 
$3 or $4 an hour if he had to. Another, 
who is trying to prepare his family for a 
possible strike in August, was told by 
his 19-year-old son that he would not 
hesitate to take his dad's job for $5 an 
hour. 
This strain of public opinion in a 
formerly solid union town did not come 
from nowhere. Unemployment in 
Johnstown has been about 20 per cent 
for nearly a year. In the local steel 
industry, it's been over 50 per cent. The 
steel companies are taking maximum 
advantage of t h e s e d e s p e r a t e 
conditions. 
When McBride turned down their 
original concessions demands in July 
and again when the local presidents 
rejected their package in November, the 
c o m p a n i e s s en t l e t t ers to all 
' ' S t e e l w o r k e r - R e p r e s e n t e d 
Employees," some 300,000 of them. 
The letters blame "your union leader-
ship" for the plight of the industry and 
for "indifference to the unemployed." 
Now, if an unemployed steelworker or 
a member of his family write a letter to 
U.S. Steel, as some have done, they 
receive a personalized reply from J. 
Bruce Johnston, USS head of industrial 
relations and the chief bargainer for the 
eight basic steel companies. The 
personal letter blames specific local 
USW leaders and urges the addressee to 
write or call them. 
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"An integrated mill is so huge... 
it dominates the landscape and 
the lives of the people around it " 
\ 
The steel companies are not seeking 
"concessions" from the steelworkers. 
They could have had $2 billion worth of 
those in July. What they're after is a 
complete restructuring of their 
"industrial relations," a dramatic 
reduction not only of steelworkers' 
wages but of their solidarity, their 
power and their pride. 
Bethlehem Steel has now played the 
trump card with shutdowns in 
Lackawanna and Johnstown. It 
threatens more shutdowns unless it 
gets local agreements on work rules and 
job combinations at specific facilities. 
Some 800 workers at rod and wire mills 
in Johnstown and Baltimore, for 
example, have been told that half of 
them will be gone next year; the group 
that remains will be the one that allows 
the most "flexible" work rules. Other 
companies are seeking similar^ local 
contracts under the threat of plant 
closings; some have already been won. 
These local concessions mean 
permanent job losses for some and 
more harried and unsafe worklives for 
the rest. More than national wage 
concessions, they threaten the 
credibility and power of the union 
where it matters most—on the shopfloor 
day in and day out. 
The United Steelworkers faces this 
onslaught divided against itself. USWA 
Vice-President Joe Odorcich, in a fit of 
pique after local presidents turned 
down the contract he helped negotiate 
in November, advised the companies to 
go after concessions at the local and 
district levels. "It would be the end of 
industrywide bargaining," Odorcich 
said, "but our guys put us in that 
position." The USWA leadership has 
made no secret that it too blames the 
steelworkers. 
Businesses open and businesses 
close, but there's something incredible 
about the shutdown of a steel mill. An 
integrated mill is so huge, it so 
dominates the landscape and the lives 
of the people around it, that it's not 
quite believable that it will no longer be 
operating. 
My father wanted to visit a steel mill 
on his vacation because as a union 
worker he identified with the industry 
in which he worked. He had machined 
some of the rolls for one of the bar mills 
at Lackawanna, and that somehow 
seemed to give him a stake in the place. 
He'd have trouble imagining that this 
jewel could be gone now. 
The shutdown of a mill in a town that 
has built its life around it, that has 
struggled to exert some control over it, 
robs people of a sense of security and 
self-esteem that is difficult to recover. 
But if the United Steelworkers allows 
itself to drift into listless submission, a 
lot more will be lost than a steel mill. 
And we'll all be the worse for it. 
(A shorter version of this article appeared in 
In These Times, Jan. 12, 1983.) 
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